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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EARL W. SADLEIR, 
Plaintiff and ResP'owdent, 
-vs.- Case No. 837 4 





STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment on a verdict 
awarding plaintiff $8000.00 general and $2000.00 puni-
tive damages in an action for ·alienation of affections. 
The appeal raises for the first time in this jurisdiction, 
so far as we are advised, the applicability of Section 
30-3-9, Utah Code Awrwtated 1953, to such an action. 
By the statute the guilty party in a divorce action for-
feits all rights acquired by the marriage. It will he con-
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tended that the right of a husband to sue for alienation 
of affections is a right arising out of the marital rela-
tionship and is forfeited by him if he is the guilty party 
in a divorce action. 
The plaintiff was divorced by his wife just prior to 
the commencement of this action. The interlocutory 
decree was entered on February 26, 1954 (Exhibit 1-D). 
The, complaint herein was filed March 27, 1954 (R. 2). 
In the divorce action, which was by default after person-
al service, it was found by F'inding No. IV of Exhibit 
1-D: 
"That since the marriage between plain tiff 
and defendant, defendant has continually belittled 
plaintiff in front of their friends and has refused 
to make family decisions without first consulting 
his parents, and during the marriage has failed 
and refused to make those decisions which a hus-
band and father should make concerning family 
affairs and that this conduct has caused plaintiff 
to lose all respect for defendant and has made 
it impossible for plaintiff to live with defendant 
as husband and wife. This conduct on the part 
of defendant has interferred with raising of the 
children and it has made it difficult for plaintiff 
and defendant to get along together and has 
caused numerous fights in front of the childre!l, 
and this has caused plaintiff to become nervous 
and C'aused her great mental distress." 
The plaintiff Sadleir, 28 years old at the time of 
the trial of the instant case (R. 46), was married on 
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3 
divorce action heeame married to Knapton, the defend-
ant herein. There are two daughters, one 3 and one 5, 
as the issue of the Sadleir marriage (R. 11). On the 
8th or 9th of January, 1954 (R. 43-44), Knapton stated 
to the plaintiff, in effect, that he, Knapton, had an af-
fection for Vera and wanted to marry her, and that if 
she would leave the plaintiff he would support her 
through the time that it takes to get a divorce decree 
and would pay for the divorce. Sadleir testified that 
he did not "think it was right" and ordered Knapton 
out of the house (R. 29). Sadleir then took his wife and 
children to his mother's home to tell his mother that 
Vera was leaving. He then took them to Vera's sister's 
home and left them there. The next morning Vera's 
parents took Vera and the children to Wendover for a 
short time after which the divorce proceedings were 
commenced (R. 31). 
Sadleir was represented by counsel at the time of 
the divorce and sat in court during his wife's testimony 
(R. 36). He heard her criticize the marriage and heard 
her say with reference to him "His folks have been in 
on everything we did, everything we bought; we had to 
get their approval on practically everything we did." 
(R. 37) and heard her testify: "Q. And, as a result, 
Mrs. Sadleir, have you lost all respect for your husband? 
A. Yes, he doesn't seem to be much -of a man to get out 
on his own and try and make us a living and a home. 
He has always had to have their okay." (R. 39-40). 
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The children, in 8adleir's presence, were awarded 
by the court, without protest on Sadleir's part, to Vera. 
(R. 41). 'Sadleir's mother was in court at the time of 
the divorce and heard Vera's testimony (R. 68), which 
testimony was received in evidence in the instant case 
(Exhibit 2-P). Mrs. Reva Sadleir, the mother of the 
plaintiff, lived directly across the street from the home 
occupied by Vera and Earl (R. 71) and attended the 
divorce proceedings with her two sons (R. 71) as on-
lookers (R. 70). 
There were no quarrels between the plaintiff and 
his wife over Knapton and no words about him (R. 27). 
Between Christmas and the 6th or 7th of January, 1954, 
Vera became moody and S.adleir contacted Knapton, 
who he talked to in front of the Kearns Building in Salt 
Lake. Sadleir asked Knapton what was going on between 
him and Vera and asked if he loved her. Knapton is 
alleged to have answered that he did but that if Sadleir 
could make a horne of it he, Knapton, "would he willing 
to back out and get out of it". Sadleir then asked Knap-
ton if he would go to S.adleir's home within the next day 
or so and tell Vera that he, Knapton, did not love her 
and that he would get out. Sadleir testified that Knap-
ton said he would. ''* * * he said he would hack me up, 
* * * to try and convince my wife to stay home in her 
own home, to make a family of her own and stay that 
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and his wife on about the 8th of January, 1954, Sadleir 
testified that Knapton "changed his story all the way 
around" and then made the statement outlined above 
(R. 29). 
The plaintiff and defendant were "buddies" (R. 
13) since their high school days in 1942 (R. 11). They 
were both in the same unit in the Navy, occupied the 
same living quarters at various Naval Stations, went 
through the smne schooling together, pursued the same 
Naval assignment, took their liberties and offduty time 
together, were discharged from the same station in 1946 
and returned together to Salt Lake City (R. 12, 17). 
The friendship between Sadleir and Knapton con-
tinued on a remarkably close basis after their discharr5e 
from the Navy. They went on camping trips together 
with their respective families, they jointly celebrated 
the birthdays of everyone in the two families and the 
friendship continued on after Sadleir's marriage (R. 18-
19). Knapton had the "free run'' of the 'Sadleir home 
(R. 19-20). Sadleir's work as a Postal Clerk resulted 
in unusual hours and Knapton would be in the Sadleir 
home on numerous occasions during Sadleir~s absence 
(R. 19-22). When asked on direct examination if Vera 
withdrew her affection from him during the period from 
May 1953 until December of that year, Sadleir testified 
"Oh, she was a little mopy at times, but, then, that was 
the same as she always had been. I thought we had: a 
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happy family." (R. 26). Sadleir and his wife continued 
to have family relations up until Christmas of 1954 and 
the holiday season was a happy occasion (R. 26-27). 
Except for the first two months of the marriage 
Sadleir and his wife lived on Southwest Temple Street 
in Salt Lake City directly across the street from Sadleir's 
mother and father, with Sadleir's brother and his wife 
on the North, a Mr. and Mrs. Arbogast on the South and 
a Mr. and Mrs. Oakley next door to Sadleir's mother's 
home. The home of Vera's mother and father, during 
a part of the time at least, was some two blocks away 
(R. 18-19, 39). 
During May 1953 Sadleir was told that his mother 
had ordered Knapton out of the former's home, for 
which 'Sadleir criticized his mother (R. 24-25) and told 
his mother to mind her own business (R. 44). Vera is 
alleged to have said to Hadleir's mother in connection 
with this incident that they were "a happy threesome" 
and were intending to make it a "foursome", but that 
Sadleir's mother said to Sadleir that Knapton would be 1 
his worst enemy (R. 25). Mrs. Arbogast, 11rs. Oakley I 
and Cleo Torgerson, a daughter of Mrs. Oakley, all testi- j 
. 
fied to having seen Knapton through an open window 1 
in a lighted room with his arms around Vera (R. 54, 58, 
77, 85). Sadleir's mother testified that her son and Knap-
ton were as close to each other as brothers (R. 60). 
There was no evidence of criminal conversation. Vera's 
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state of mind was reflected only by the divorce proceed-
ings. Neither she nor the defendant Knapton testified 
in the instant case. 
The defendant moved for a directed verdict at the 
close of the plaintiff's case without submitting any evi-
dence (R. 103-105) after the plaintiff introduced phono-
graph records, gifts of Knapton to both of the Sadleirs, 
and which on occasions were played in the presenee of 
each of them (R·. 101-102). Defendant's motion for judg-
ment in accordance with his motion for directed verdid, 
or in the alternative for a new trial (R. 136) was there-
after denied (R. 138). 
STAT'EMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT. 
(a) BY REASON OF SECTION 30-3-9, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953. 
(b) BY REASON OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S EVIDENCE. 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE JURY. 
(a) IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE 
STATE OF PLAINTIFF'S FEELINGS AS AFFECTING THE 
CHIILDREN. 
(b) IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER PUNI-
TIVE DAMAGES. 
3. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT. 
(a) BY REASON OF SECTION 30-3-9, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953. 
The statute, which is identical with Section 598.16 
Iowa Code 1950, reads as follows: 
"When a divorce is decreed the guilty party 
forfeits all rights acquired by marriage." 
The only State, other than Iowa and Utah, which 
has a similar statute, so far as our search has disclosed, 
is Missouri, Section 452,090, Revised Statutes 1949. The 
Missouri statute has been construed contrary to the con-
struction placed upon the Iowa statute by the court of 
that State and contrary to our views. See De Ford v. 
Johnson, 251 Mo. 244, 158 8.W. 29,46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1083, 
Ann. Cas. 1915A 344, on rehearing 177 S.W. 577 (1915). 
It is conceded that in the absence of statute the general 
rule is that a divorce, even where it is for the fault of 
the plaintiff, does not bar or affect and is not a defense 
to an action for alienation of affections. 27 Am. Jur., 
Husband and Wife, Section 577, page 179. The Iowa 
case of Hamilton v. McNeill, 150 Iowa 470, 129 N.W. 480, 
Ann. Cas. 1912D 604 (1911), states the rule for which 
we contend but which, nevertheless, the Missouri court 
in the D.e Ford case refused to follow. We will confine 
our citation of authority, under this point, to the Mis-
souri case of De Ford v. Johnson and the Iowa case of 
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Hamilton v. McNeill in the hopes that this court will 
adopt the Iowa rule rather than the construction adopted 
by Missouri. 
The l\Iissouri court holds that the alienation of af-
fections gives the husband a right of action ''as complete 
and perfect as does an injury to his tangible property. 
It is completed upon the perpetration of the wrong. It 
does not accrue to him under or by virtue of the mar-
riage, but under and by virtue of the violation of a per-
sonal right of his own, which gives him a claim for com-
pensation against the wrongdoer, in which she (the wife) 
can neither then nor thenceforth have any interest." The 
court goes on to say (177 S.W. 577) that: 
"It is no more a product of the marriage than 
would be a claim against one who had wrongfully 
inflicted a physical injury upon her for medicine 
and medical attendance provided in the perfor-
mance of his duty with respect to her cure." 
The Missouri court says that the statute: 
"clearly refers, in apt words, to rights and 
claims which the marriage gives him, and not to 
those which come from a violation of his mar-
riage rights; to rights and claims which effect 
the interests of his wife, and not to those which 
exist only between himself and strangers." 
(supra). 
In contrast to the philosophy of the Missouri Court 
Justice Weaver pointed out in the concurring opinion 
in Hamilton v. McNeill that the right to maintain an 
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action for damages against a person who alienates the 
affections of his wife is a right peculiar to the marriage 
relation "and if that marriage be dissolved because of 
his fault or wrong, the statute says in effect that the 
right of action which was incident thereto ends with it." 
The concurring decision says that the expression all 
rights as used in the statute is without limitation and 
that if it should be said that the husband, nevertheless, 
retained the right for alienation of affections, then the 
statute would be amended "by dictum of the court." 
As to the contention that the statutory provision 
relates only to property rights Justice Weaver in the 
Hamilton case said such an answer was "very inade-
quate". The Justice calls attention to the proposition 
that under the laws of Iowa, and which laws in the par-
ticulars mentioned are similar if not identical to our 
own, the rights acquired by a husband in the property 
of his wife are inchoate only and depend for their exist-
ence upon the existence of the marriage relation at the 
ti1ne of the wife's death "and therefore the decree which 
dissolves the marriage has the instant effect to termin-
ate ·all such rights." Justice Weaver then says: 
"Such being the case, we may presume the 
Legislature knew the statute was unnecessary ~o 
protect the property right of parties to a divorce, 
and this statute was intended to mean precisely 
what it says. Nor does this construction of the 
act work any obvious wrong to the divorced hus-
band. If, as appellee now undertakes to say, he 
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ground for the divorce which he assisted her in 
obtaining and was robbed of her love by the ma-
chinations of the appellant, he had only to speak 
the truth and show his hand to secure the dis-
missal of that action, and retain the right to salve 
his wounded honor by the recovery of a cash 
equivalent. As he did not choose that course, but 
voluntarily elected to play the part of a husband 
whose misconduct entitled his wife to a dissolu-
tion of the marriage, he ought to be content to 
accept the decree which he invited, with all its 
statutory trimmings." 
Sadleir instituted this action less than thirty days 
after he sat in court listening to his wife condemn the 
marriage and her statement that she had lost all respect 
for him because of matters and things entirely unrelated 
to Knapton. Sadleir sat mute and permitted the court 
to act on his wife's testimony and the children to be 
placed in her custody and control. In maintaining the 
present action he is, in effect, saying that he had the 
grounds for a divorce, that his wife committed perju:ry 
and that the whole court proceeding was a mockery. By 
permitting Sadleir to ridicule the divorce proceedings 
through this kind of an action, and under the circurn-
stances pointed out, the door is open for connivance, 
collusion and litigation which challenges the integrity 
of the judicial process. The importance of the funda-
mental principle herein involved transcends by far the 
interests of the individual. The state is directly inter-
ested. Justice Weaver in his opinion in the Hamilton 
case had this to say on that subject: 
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''Concerning another question presented hy 
this appeal I am ready to concede that the cat;e 
before us is not one coming within the ordinary 
rule of res adjudicata, which requires for its ap-
plication identity of parties and subject-matter, 
and I do not understand the majority opinion as 
holding otherwise. But the effect of a decree •Jf 
divorce is not limited to the husband and wife 
who are parties thereto. The state - the public 
of which these persons are a part - has a direct 
interest therein. It is in the interest of good 
morals and common decency that litigation in-
volving domestic infelicity, crimination, and re-
crimination ·between husband and wife be limited 
within the narrowest possible bounds, and in my 
judgment sound public policy will be best promo-
ted by holding that he against whom a divorce is 
decreed shall not be heard in any other or colla-
teral proceeding, whether his former wife is or is 
not a party thereto, to call in question the merits 
of any controversy between the former husband 
'and wife which was or might have been settled 
as between themselves by the decree which sever-
ed their relations." 
The legislative mandate that the guilty party for-
feits all rights acquired by marriage must be given Pf-
fect. It is a statement of public policy. Justice Weaver 
fits the strikingly similar factual premise into the philo-
sophy of the statute by the following expression: 
"Nor can I believe there is anything in pub-
lic policy nor any principles of morals which 
should impel the court to ingraft an implied ex~ 
ception upon the statute. The case before us is an 
impressive illustration of the evils which must 
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follow the establishment of the rule for which ap-
pellee contends. The court in which a divorce 
proceeding is pending affords the parties thereto 
every reasonable opportunity to test the truth and 
merit of their matrimonial controversies. If the 
husband who is charged with misconduct justify-
ing a dissolution of the marriage has any defense 
to such accusation, or any showing to make in 
palliation or mitigation, there is the place to make 
it and prove it. If he seeks to justify or recrinli-
nate because of the misconduct of his wife there 
is the place to plead it. There they stand on equal 
footing, and each may be heard in person and 
by witnesses, and have their respective rights and 
interests guarded by counsel. When this oppor-
tunity has been given and the court has found for 
one party and against the other, and adjudged one 
of them guilty of such violation of the marriage 
obligation as to justify a divorce, it is but simple 
justice to provide that, so long as that decree re-
mains in legal force and effect, he against whom 
it is announced shall not be heard to assert any 
right based upon or derived from the marriage 
contract which his own wrong has terminated. 
To say that a husband may submit to a divorce 
on the ground of his own misconduct, and then in 
a suit against a third person in which his wife is 
not a party assert a right based upon the marri-
age relation which he has forfeited, put her char-
acter and virtue as a wife in issue, and secure 
for himself what may be termed a moral reversal 
of the decree rendered against him, and brand 
with infamy the woman whom the court has once 
vindicated, would be to announce a rule unworthy 
of place in any enlightened scheme for the pro-
motion and administration of justice." 
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Divorce litigation is odious enough in the simplest 
of C'ases, but when a party can .sit by and be- branded 
as the guilty party without the slightest effort on his 
part to show otherwise, and then turn around and become 
the moving party in an alienation of affections suit sur-
rounde'd by a cloak of judicial respectability, the odious-
ness becomes more intolerable. J'ustice Henriod in his 
concurring decision in the case of Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 
Utah 2d 362, 267 P. 2d 759, squinted at the unsavoriness 
of this kind of litigation: 
"Since the main opinion reduces the punitive 
damages to the figure noted, I concur. I would 
have concurred more readily had such damages 
been eliminated altogether and could we have 
reduced substantially the compensatory damageEl. 
The record reflects that plaintiff himself was not 
entirely free from indiscretion, and the type of 
action he pursues is frowned upon in some juris-
dictions, to the point where, together with similar 
actions, it has been abrogated by statute-for 
obvious reasons." 
At the risk of having it said that we belabor the 
decision in Rantilton v. MeN eill, we feel that we must, 
nevertheless, quote from the decision at length. Its 
rationalization of the statute so decisively answers the 
decision of the Missouri court in De Ford v. Johnson that 
the case merits, in our opinion, extensive quotations. 
In the Hamilton case the divorce was obtained in March 
of 1906. Sometime 'after the decree of divorce the de-
fendant married the plaintiff's former wife. Thereupon 
the alienation action was brought. The defendant plead-
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ed the facts as to the rendition of a decree of divorce 
against the plaintiff in favor of his wife, and averred that 
by the findings of such decree the plaintiff was the guilty 
party and that he had thereby forfeited all right to 
maintain the alienation of affection suit. The court said: 
"We think it must he said that plaintiff's 
right, if any, to maintain this action, is necessarily 
a right 'acquired by the marriage.' The cause of 
action is one which could arise only out of and 
by vi~ue of the marriage relation. On the face 
of the statute, therefore, the plaintiff, having been 
adjudged in the divorce decree to be the guilty 
party, forfeited 'all rights acquired by the mar-
riage.' Levins v. Sleator, 2 G. Greene, 604; Lucas 
v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 517; Maynard v. Hill, 125 
U.S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654; Nolin v. 
Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N.E. 890, 4 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 643, 114 Am. St. Rep. 605." 
It was contended, nevertheless, that thH defendant in the 
alienation of affection suit was not a party to the di-
vorce decree and is, therefore, entitled to no benefits 
from the adjudication had therein. This proposition is 
rationalized by the court as follows: 
"The question at this point is not who shall 
be the beneficiaries of the statute under consider-
ation, but what consequences shall ensue to the 
'guilty party' as adjudged in a divorce decree. 
The statute has to do not only with the peculiar 
and individual rights of the parties to the suit 
as between themselves, but it has to do also with 
the public right and the public interest. If the 
Legislature deemed it to the public interest, and 
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so enacted, that in case of divorce the guilty party 
should forfeit 'all rights acquired by the marri-
age,' we know of no rule that would permit such 
forfeiture to he avoided by a showing that such 
forfeiture would operate to the benefit in a nega-
tive sense of an undeserving person. The follow-
ing discussion in Dillon v. Allen, 46 Iowa 299, 26 
Am. Rep. 145, is pertinent at this point: 'The 
effects of statutes which make unlawful specified 
acts, upon persons violating them or aiding in 
their violation are not considered in their enforce-
ment by the courts. If one offender suffers there-
by and the other gains an apparent benefit, no 
arguments can be drawn therefrom for suspend-
ing the operation of the law. This is an incident 
in the administration of justice against which 
neither Legislatures nor the courts can provide. 
The party suffering, being in delicto, cannot com-
plain of the operation of the law, for he merits 
the punishment prescribed for its violation. It 
cannot he said that the law confers upon the other 
a benefit because of his violation of its provisions. 
What he gains comes to him as a punishment 0f 
the other party, not as a reward to himself.' If 
the defendant herein were attempting to build for 
himself an affirmative case upon the alleged for-
feiture, the question of his desert and the fact 
that he was not a party to the adjudication would 
be a more important consideration.'' 
The plaintiff then contended that the rights "ac-
quired by the marriage" referred to in the statute are 
those rights and obligations otherwise owed to the "guilty 
party" by his spouse, the forfeiture of which would inure 
to the benefit of such spouse alone. The court said that 
the effect of this construction would be to obliterate "this 
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part of the statute" and to leave it without any function 
whatever. The court then made reference to other .:;ec-
tions of the statute, permitting questions of alimony and 
the custody of children to be determined by the court .in 
each given case. Reference was also made to the right 
of dower, which under the Iowa statute is terminated by 
mere force of the decree of divorce, and that the right 
of either party, whether guilty or innnocent, is neither 
greater nor less than the right of the other so far as the 
question of dower is concerned. The court held that the 
statute served no function with reference to dower or to 
alimony, or to the custody of the children, and as against 
the suggestion that the statute was enacted at a time 
when the rule of the common law was in doubt, and that 
it was intended only to be declaratory of the common law 
as to the effect of the decree of divorce in determining 
the right of dower, the court stated that the statute inl-
poses a forfeiture upon the "guilty party" alone. 
"If it were intended to determine only the 
question of dower, its clear implication would be 
that no forfeiture was imposed upon the innocent 
party in that respect; whereas the rule of the 
common law as announced by this court in its 
early cases holds dower to be barred to either 
party, whether guilty or innocent. * * * It is 
our conclusion, therefore, that we cannot hold 
this provision of the statute to be merely declara-
tory of the common law and as mere surplusage.'~ 
It was urged that the application of the statute would 
be a violation of the constitution in that it deprived 
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the plaintiff of a vested right of property without due 
process of law. The court held that this was not tenable. 
"The statute provides for no forfeiture ex-
cept after due process of law. The divorce pro-
ceeding resulting in a decree constituted due 
process of law. It was none the less so because 
defendant made default. The statute gave to him 
full warning as to the consequences in case of 
an adverse decree. Possibly the very purpose of 
the statute was to discourage default and to en-
courage a contest and a presentation thereby of 
the point of view of both parties. This would aid 
the court in ascertaining the real truth .and would 
operate to the public interest." 
Particular stress was laid upon the proposition that 
a decree of divorce is binding as ·an adjudication only 
as between the parties thereto and that it is not binding 
as between either party and a third party. It was argued 
that the plaintiff had the right to plead by reply, that 
the allegations of the petition in the divorce case were 
false and that the findings were not in fact true. lie 
·averred that he was not in fact the guilty party, although 
the decree found him so, and that he was not guilty of 
the acts of cruelty charged against him in the decree. 
He contends in the alienation case for his right to contra-
dict the decree as between him and the defendant. As to 
this the court said: 
''The general rule that an adjudication is 
binding as such only upon the parties to the liti-
gation and their privies may be taken for granted. 
This general rule, however, has various and vary-
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ing exceptions which we will not stop now to note. 
The difficulty with applying such rule to a divorce 
case is that, Vn, the eyes of the law, the parties to 
the case .are not the only parties in interest in the 
litigation. In ordinary litigation, the parties to 
the case may waive proofs and concede facts and 
stipulate for judgment. In such a case the court 
may properly grant to plaintiff all the relief which 
is not resisted by the defendant. In a divorce 
case, the court is charged with a special duty to-
ward the public. It must look beyond the wishes 
of the parties. It must often ignore admissions 
and be watchful against collusions, and must as-
certain as near as may be the very truth, even 
though it result in the defeat of the mutual wishes 
of both parties. Unless the real facts as the court 
shall find them from the evidence justify a divorce 
under the law, then it must be r.efused, even 
though both parties desire it. In such a case, the 
court is dealing with something more than the 
private rights of the parties to the case. The mar-
riage to be dissolved is "YYAot a mere contr-act, b1,tt 
is a status. In such stat11s, the public interest 
is invol.ved in a very sensit.ive way. A decree of 
divorce dissolves not only the marriage contract, 
but changes the status of the parties and thereby 
their relation to the public as well as to each other. 
The binding force of such decree necessarily en-
ters into the future relations of the parties, not 
only as between themselves, but affects also their 
rel-ations with third parties. The parties to the 
case may enter into other marriages and the 
validity or voidability of such marriages, as the 
case may be, must necessarily depend upon the 
validity of the decree of divorce. If a third party 
may not rest upon the verity of a decree of di-
vorce, then it must logically follow that such de-
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cree has not been effective to establish or to 
change the status of the parties thereto. If we 
were to adopt the theory of the appeUee in this 
respect, it would de,epen the mire through which 
the adm.inistnation' of the divorce law is too often 
drawn. The burden laid upon the courts to ad-
minister this law strictly according to its very 
spirit is necessarily an onerous one in default 
cases. False testimony may be adduced. Import-
ant facts may be withhheld. The defaulting de-
fendant offers the court no aid. Too often he de-
sires that a decree of divorce be entered. It is, 
therefore, always possible that a decree be found 
upon false testimony be the judge diligent as he 
may. If, therefore, a defendant thus willingly ob-
tain his freedom from the marriage bond, either 
by collusion or by silence at the trial, there is 
much reason why the adverse findings of the de-
cree against him should bind him for all time. 
Such a rule would tend at least to deter the evil 
practice. On the other hand, if he may tempo-
rarily assent to frtlsehood either by collusion or 
silence in order to enable a decree of divorce to 
be o htained, .and then afterwards in his freedom 
from the bond, repudiate to his own advantage 
the facts upon which the decree of dissolution 
was entered, such a rule can tend only to the great 
reproach of the administration of the law." (Em-
phasis added.) 
Plaintiff contended that the decree of divorce was 
obtained not only upon false allegations in the divorce 
petition but that it was obtained by collusion between 
the parties thereto, and that it is void as between the 
parties themselves. The testimony in the case is said to 
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be undisputed that the plaintiff, husband, counseled with 
and employed the attorney who brought the divorce suit 
for the wife against him. 
"We do not think this fact aids the plaintiff 
in the present action. On the contrary, it furnish-
es an additional reason why he should be forbid-
den to show to his own advantage the falsity of a 
decree which he collusively obtained. It is abhor-
rent to the judicial sense and subversive of legal 
morals that a defendant may aid the plaintiff in 
obtaining the solemn conclusions of the court in 
the form of a decree of divorce and may after-
wards, in another action in the same court, flout 
the decree before the jury, and say, 'Gentlemen, 
this is all false. The judge did the best he could, 
but we wanted the decree and we fooled him. I 
have never asked to set aside the decree and I 
do not ask it now. I only want you to say that 
its findings are not true in fact, and that I was 
never guilty of any of the charges sustained 
against me.' 
* * * * 
"We reach the conclusion that the general 
rule that an adjudication is binding only upon the 
parties thereto and their privies is not applicable 
to a divorce decree as broadly as to an ordinary 
adjudication which involves only private rights. 
Without attempting to define an exact rule ap-
plicable in all cases to divorce decrees, we reach 
the conclusion tha:t under the undisputed showing 
in this case the plaintiff cannot be heard in this 
action to impeach the verity of the decree of di-
vorce nor to deny the grounds upon which the 
decree was obtained, for the purpose of avoiding 
the statutory forfeiture; and he must be conclu-
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sively deemed to be the 'guilty party.' For cases 
bearing upon the question, see Karren v. Karren, 
25 Utah 87, 69 Pac. 465, 60 L.R.A. 294, 95 Am. St. 
Rep. 815; Ellis v. Ellis, 55 Minn. 401, 56 N. W. 
1056, 23 L.R.A. 287, 43 Am. St. Rep. 514; Moor 
v. Moor, (Tex. Civ. App.) 63 S.W. 347; Gordon 
v. Dickison, 131 Ill. 141, 23 N.E. 439; Orth v. Orth, 
69 Mich. 158, 37 N.W. 67." 
The court distinguishes between its previous case of 
Wood v. M,athews, 47 Iowa 409, a case involving criminal 
conversation, .and holds that a case of simple alienation 
by alleged acts and arts not in themselves criminal is 
essentially different in its nature from an action for 
criminal conversation, although both contain some ele-
ments in common, and, therefore, did not overrule the 
Wood v. Mathews case. The court states that no case 
had been brought to its attention from any state wherein 
a "guilty party" in a divorce decree ever maintained an 
action for damages for simple alienation of affection as 
distinguished from criminal conversation. By way of 
conclusion the court stated: 
"Finally our conclusions may be summed up 
in brief form as follows: (1) That the right of 
action for damages for alienation of affection is a 
'right acquired by the marriage' within the mean-
ing of section 3181 of the Code. That by the terms 
of this statute 'the guilty party' forfeits such 
right. (2) That the forfeiture declared by the 
statute must be recognized by the court regard-
less of any advantage resulting thereby to any 
defendant. This is so not because of any affirma-
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of the absence of right in the plaintiff. And the 
forfeiture is properly pleadable as such by a 
defendant. (3) That the decree of divorce shown 
in this record fixed the status of the plaintiff 
herein as the 'guilty party' therein within the 
meaning of said section 3181. The question at this 
point is not so much whether the decree is con-
clusive as between plaintiff herein and third par-
ties, and as affecting alleged affirmative rights 
of such third parties, but whether the decree is 
conclusive upon the plaintiff himself as bringing 
him within the operation of the statute in ques-
tion. We hold it to be conclusive upon plaintiff 
in the latter respect, and that he became there'by 
subject instanter to the forfeiture declared by 
the statute. ( 4) That plaintiff's plea that the 
divorce was obtained by his own collusion will not 
avail to relieve him from its conclusiveness while 
it remains in force. ( 5) We recognize that our 
conclusions herein are not in harmony with the 
result announced in Wood v. ::Mathews, 4 7 Iowa 
409. In that case, however, the statute under con-
sideration was not brought to the attention of the 
court either by pleading or argument, nor did the 
court assume to construe the statute nor to pass 
upon it in any way. It was manifestly overlooked 
both by counsel and court. The point was decided 
without discussion and erroneously based upon 
two supposed precedents which were not such in 
fact. Under these circumstances we would not 
be justified in ignoring the statute under the au-
thority of the Wood case." 
The court then calls attention to the fact that the 
views expressed are the views of the majority of the 
court and that an ''emphatic and permeated with feeling" 
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dissent is made by the minority court. In view of the 
dissents the court reiterates: 
'~Of course, in view of the fact that the major-
ity opinion is based upon our statute, the question 
of outside authorities is not controlling, although 
appropriate. And in view of the claim made in 
the dissent that the majority puts the statute to 
an 'unholy service' and operates as a protection 
to 'infamy,' and in view of the call that is made 
upon the Legislature for relief from the opera-
tion of the statute as so contrued, an examination 
of the authorities outside of Iowa is quite inter-
esting. What is disclosed thereby~ There are di-
vorces abundant and too many. There are aliena-
tion suits-hundreds of them; perhaps thousands. 
By whom have these alienation suits been main-
tained~ Those maintained by the 'guilty party' 
after divorce can be counted on the hand, with a 
margin to spare. In no less than 40 states such a 
suit by the 'guilty party' is unknown to their re-
ports. And this, too, in the absence of statute in, 
most of such states. Is this a record of infamy~ 
'The absence of precedent is precedent.' Thomas 
v. Adams Ex. Co., 1 Pennewill (Del.) 142, 39 Atl. 
1015. 
"Without pressing the query whether the call 
for legislative relief, above referred to, does not 
put a dissenting opinion to an inappropriate func-
tion, it is sufficient to say now that the question 
of the propriety of the statute lies wholly within 
the legislative judgment. While the statute re-
mains it must be given effect by the court. It is 
too definite and substantial to be blown away by 
mere indignation or to be reduced to ashes by heat 
of denunciation. 
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"The statement of the dissent that the hold-
ing of the majority is made to depend 'upon a sup-
posed rule of public policy or by some species of 
estoppel' is not accurate nor quite fair. The ma-
jority holding is based upon the sta,tute and upon 
that alone as all-sufficient. The only question of 
public policy involved is that of the statute; and 
the only question of estoppel involved is that 
which inheres in the decree of divorce. These 
particular tern1s are not used in the majority opin-
ion, but originate in the dissent. The extended 
discussion on these subjects is largely based upon 
a mistaken construction of the majority holding. 
Much of it is not fairly applicable to the majority 
holding, but is a deflection of the argument to-
ward an improvised target. In so far as the legis-
lative policy involved in the statute is called in 
question, we defend it as appropriate and sound." 
It seems to us that the Hamilton case logically 
answers every argument that can be made on behalf of 
the plaintiff on the controlling effect of our statute. We 
have in the instant case the words of Vera herself that 
she lost all respect for her husband by reason of his con-
duct during the marriage, and we have a finding of the 
court to that effect. The alleged causal connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the loss of Vera's 
affections for her former husband is completely dissi-
pated by the divorce decree itself and the adjudication 
thereby that the plaintiff herein was the guilty party in 
such regard. 'ro give the statute the effect clearly in-
tended by the Legislature will do much, as suggested 
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by the Iowa court, to lessen rather than deepen the mire 
through which the administration of the divorce law is 
too often drawn. 
(b) BY REASON OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S EVIDENCE. 
In 27 Am. Jur., Husbamd and' Wife, Section 553, page 
153, it is said : 
"In an action for alienation of affections or 
criminal conversation, the burden is on the plain-
tiff to prove the elements of his cause of action. 
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show 
that the defendant was the active, inducing cause 
of any alleged loss or alienation of affections.'' 
It is recognized that there are three elements in a 
cause of action for alienation of affections: (1) Wrong-
ful conduct of the defendant; (2) loss of affection or 
consortium; and (3) a causal connection between such 
conduct and loss. 27 Am. Jur., Husband and wife, Sec-
tion 553, page 125. The evidence with reference to the 
divorce proceedings and Vera's testimony thereat was 
all introduced in plaintiff's case in chief. Such evidence 
was before the court at the time of the 1notion for direct-
ed verdict. The clear implication therefrom that Vera's 
loss of affection for her former husband was occasioned 
by her husband's lack of consideration for her and not 
occasioned by anything said or done by the defendant 
was not dispelled or dissipated by the plaintiff's evi-
dence. We submit that the evidence conclusively s·hows 
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that the loss of affection was because of the acts and 
conduct of the plaintiff herein and not otherwise. In 
Wilson v. Oldroyd, supra, it is said: 
"Mrs. Wilson was both willing and anxious 
to testify for Dr. Oldroyd and against the plain-
tiff. Actually she was permitted to testify fully 
as to difficulties in her married life with plain-
tiff, the absence of conveniences in their home, 
her husband's lack of consideration for her, and 
that she had lost all affection for him before the 
doctor entered her life, which evidence, if bel.ieved, 
would have sustained defendamt' s contm'lltion that 
there were no affections to alienate." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the instant case the environment that Vera was 
subjected to in the sense that Sadleir's mother was di-
rectly across the street, Sadleir's brother directly to the 
North and the neighborhood situation, as reflected by the 
testimony of Mrs. Arbogast, Mrs. Oakley and Mrs. 
Oakley's daughter, Mrs. Torgerson, could understand-
ably become intolerable. It is all reflected in the court's 
findings in the divorce case and in Vera's testimony at 
that hearing, along with the fact that Sadleir permitted 
family interference in the marriage and that Sadleir 
refused his wife's repeated requests to seek another 
residence. There is no testimony in this case showing 
that the cause for Vera's loss of affections was other 
than as reflected in her testimony at the divorce hearing 
and as found by the court in its findings in connection 
therewith. Vera was not called as a witness in the instant 
case and we submit that the state of her affections cannot 
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be shown by the conversations between the plaintiff and 
defendant or by the petty events narrated by the neigh-
bors where the plaintiff's testimony affirmatively shows 
that Knapton had the free run of the home, was always 
a welcome guest and was looked upon a.s a brother in his 
relationship to the pla:intiff. Plaintiff has failed to sus-
tain the burden of proof of a causal connection between 
the loss of affection of his former wife and the alleged 
conduct of Knapton. 
This Court in the Oldroyd case, with reference to in-
structions of the trial court, holds that the plaintiff has 
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the wrongful acts or conduct on the part of the de-
fendant were the controlling cause of inducing the plain-
tiff's wife to withdraw her affections from the plaintiff 
when it said: 
"It is true that there may be great or little 
affection and .that the damages should be propor-
tionate to that which is taken away from the hus-
band. In other instructions the court amply safe-
guarded the defendant's theory in regard there-
to by expressly so advising the jury. He also 
instructed, 'If the acts or conduct of the plain tiff 
himself, or any other cause than the acts of the 
defendant constituted the controlling cause, * 11= *' 
of plaintiff's loss of affections, then he could not 
recover, and conversely told the jury that the 
same would be true 'if the plaintiff's wife fell in 
love with defendant without any affirmative in-
ducement or encouragement from the defendant 
* * * .' And further, 'in any event you should not 
hold the defendant liable unless you find from a 
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preponderance of the evidence that the wrongful 
acts or conduct on the part of the defendant were 
the controlling cause of inducing the plaintiff's 
wife to withdraw her affection from the plaintiff.' 
The instructions viewed as a whole, fully and 
fairly presented defendant's various theories of 
defense and were in no way prejudicial to him." 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE JURY. 
(a) IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE 
STATE OF PLAINTIFF'S FEELINGS AS AFFECTING THE 
CHIILDREN. 
In instruction number 13 (R. 127) the court instruct-
ed the jury in part as follows: 
''You should consider the state of feelings 
existing between the plaintiff and his wife prior 
to the acts complained of, the nature of their 
family life, the number and age of their children, 
the probability or improbability of the continu-
ance of their association as husband and wife, and 
whether the plaintiff suffered much or little be-
cause of defendant's acts." 
Exception was taken to the aborve (R. 107), at which 
time it was stated, in effect, that the plaintiff's wife se-
cured a divorce from him, that this court, or a division 
of this court, had jurisdiction of the subject matter of 
that action, of the parties and of the minor children and 
that it was by the action of the court in a suit in which 
the present defendant was not named that the plaintiff 
in this action was deprived of the custody of his children 
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and not by anything that the defendant can be chargeable 
with having done, the plaintiff having defaulted as the 
defendant in the divorce action. 
Sadleir sat in the courtroom and permitted the 
custody of his children to be awarded to Vera without 
protest, and now he turns around and says that Knapton 
was responsible for the action of the court. If there was 
ever a time that a man should speak, believing himself 
to be wronged and having a deep attachment for his chil-
dren, it was in the divorce proceedings. Thirty days 
later he attempted to put a price tag on the loss of the 
society of his children. The philosophy so artfully ex-
pressed in the case of Ham.ilton v. McNeill is understand-
able. It is indeed "abhorent to the judicial sense and 
subversive of legal morals that a defendant may aid the 
plaintiff in obtaining the solemn conclusions of the court 
in the form of a decree of divorce and may afterwards, 
in another action in the same court, flout the decree be-
fore the jury, and say, " 'Gentlemen, this is all false. 
The judge did the best he could, but we wanted the decree 
and we fooled him. I have never asked to set aside the 
decree .and I do not ask it now. I only want you to say 
that its findings are not true in fact, and that I was never 
guilty of any of the charges sustained against me.'" 
It was the action of the court in the best interests of 
the ~hildren that deprived Sadleir of the custody of the 
children and not the action of Knapton. The prejudicial 
effect of the instruction is apparent when one contem-
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plates the argument of articulate counsel playing upon 
the heartstrings of human emotions in centering atten-
tion upon the children with the aid of the court's instruc-
tion. 
(b) IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER PUNI-
TIVE DAMAGES. 
Instruction number 14 (R. 128) and excepted to (R. 
107) has to do with punitive damages. Punitive damages 
were awarded in the Oldroyd case. This Court held them 
to be excessive, ordered a reduction of the verdict and 
stated the general rule with respect to such damages as 
follows: 
"Punitive damages are awarded on the theory 
that it is permissible in case of certain aggravated 
wrongs to permit the private litigant, in the public 
interest, to impose a penalty upon the defendant 
as a punishment and to deter others from engag-
ing in similar offenses. * * * 
"There is no definite formula or basis upon 
which punitive damages can be computed. They 
have to fall within the limits of reason; 'must not 
be so disproportionate to the injury and to the 
actual damage as to plainly manifest that they 
were the result of passion and prejudice' and 
must be correlated with the other facts and cir-
cumstances shown in evidence including defend-
ant's wealth." 
In the instant case Knapton was like one of the 
family. His society was courted by the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff and his wife never had any words or criticism 
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concerning his conduct. 'Sadleir testified, when asked if 
Vera withdrew her affection from him between May of 
1953 and December of that year, that she was "a little 
mopy at times, but, then, that was the same as she always 
had been. I thought we had a happy family." There is 
nothing in the record that shows "wilful and intentional 
acts and conduct" on the part of the defendant or that 
entitled the jury to consider whether "the actions of de-
fendant were perpetrated wilfully and with gross and 
wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights" or that he acted 
''with wantonness and positive misconduct, manifesting 
a conscious disregard for the rights of plaintiff and a 
reckless indifference to the consequences," the establish-
ed law of the case by the court's instruction under 14. 
On the 8th day of January, 19'54, when the marriage 
had already fallen apart, the defendant told the plaintiff 
that he lorved Vera and would support her during the time 
that it took to get a divorce and would pay for the same. 
A day or so before the defendanat told the plaintiff if 
Sadleir could make a home of it he would he willing to 
back out and get out of it. This kind of talk, in light of 
all the circumstances of the case, does not spell out the 
wantonness and "positive misconduct" that the instruc-
tion refers to. Sadleir could not nor did he adduce any 
evidence whatsoever to justify the giving of instruction 
number 14. By the giving of the instru0tion the jury was 
permitted to speculate to the prejudice of the defendant 
upon matters that just did not exist and the evidence did 
not merit. 
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3. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The motion (R. 136) was based upon the grounds 
o.f excessive damages, insufficiency of evidence, that 
the verdict is against law and error in law, particularly 
in the instructions to the jury, and are points that have 
been heretofore suggested and argued, except perhaps 
for the question of excessive damages. 
Again we refer to the Oldroyd case where the court 
reduced the amount of punitive damages. But in the 
instant case there is not even proof as to the earning 
capacity of the defendant, to say nothing of the value of 
his accumulations, if any. The amount of $8000.00 as 
compensatory damages and $2000.00 as punitive dam-
ages, when viewed in connection with the record in this 
case, could not have been o,ther than the result of passion 
and prejudice. Only six of the eight jurors concurred 
in the verdict (R. 134-A). Be that as it may the result 
that was reached could not help but have been an arbi-
trary and emotional one without consideration to the 
realties of the situation and plaintiff's passive role in the 
divorce proceedings. The mere fact that the jury was 
able to speculate upon plaintiff's feelings with regard to 
the alleged loss of society of his children is sufficient, 
we believe, to demonstrate the emotional aspect of the 
verdict and that it should not be allowed to stand. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Missouri court persists in treating a wife as a 
chattel. The case of DeFord v. J oh!nson avoids the stat-
ute on the basis that the husband has a vested property 
right in his wife's affections that the statute does uot 
forfeit in the event of a divorce. The Iowa court ration-
alizes the statute as an expression of public policy requir-
ing the husband to test the truth and merit of his posi-
tion in the divorce court and to suffer the full conse-
quences of forfeiture of all rights acquired by the mar-
riage if he be .adjudged the guilty party. The Utah stat-
ute, identical with that of Iowa, gives this Court an op-
portunity to strike down this kind of litigation, under the 
circumstances as we find them here, otherwise the guilty 
party in the divorce action is guilty in name only and 
can judicially ridicule the divorce decree. The Iowa rule 
gives full effect to the Legislative mandate. Missouri 
dilutes the statute. 
Aside from the statute the plaintiff has wholly fail-
ed to sustain his burden of proof that Knapton alienated 
Vera's affections. Plaintiff's own evidence conclusively 
shows Vera's state of mind to have been brought about 
by the plaintiff's own conduct and his lack of attention 
to the fundamentals of a healthy marriage relationship. 
There were no affections to be alienated. 
The plaintiff in this case, who sat mute in the divorce 
action while the court awarded the custody of the chil-
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dren and the divorce to Vera, should not, in common 
decency, be now permitted to say that Knapton and not 
himself was the cause of his alleged distress. We contend 
that the obviously emotional judgment should not stand 
either as a reward to the plaintiff or to salve his alleged-
ly wounded feelings or as compensation for the position 
that he gave up without protest, except for the simple 
statement to Knapton that he did not "think it was 
right." 
The judgment appealed from should be reversed 
and the cause remanded with such instructions as to this 
Court seem proper. 
Respectfully yours, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSO~ 
At.torneys for Defendarnt and Appellant 
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